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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Absence of Quorum in
Congressional Committee Hearings
Petitioner gave false testimony under oath before a standing com-
mittee of the House of Representatives, and was convicted of perjury in
the district court.' The conviction was affirmed in the Court of Ap-
peals,2 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.8 The Court in a
five to four decision4 reversed the conviction, and held that the com-
mittee was not a "competent tribunal" within the meaning of the per-
jury statute,5 because a quorum of the committee was not "actually
physically present" at the time the perjured testimony was given. In
so holding the Court was called upon to examine the appropriate parlia-
mentary rules of procedure of the House of Representatives.
The House rules which have been described as "perhaps the most
finely adjusted, scientifically balanced, and highly technical rules of any
parliamentary body in the world" emanate from four sources: (1) The
Constitution of the United States (2) Jefferson's Manualo (3) from
the rules adopted by the House itself from the beginning of its exist-
ence,7 and (4) from the decisions of the Speakers of the House, and
from decisions of the Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole.8
The Constitution gives the power to each House of Congress to
determine its rules of procedure ;9 however certain limitations on this
grant are also contained therein.10 Among these is the requirement
that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,",
'U. S. v. Christoffel,-App. D. C.-(D. D. C. 1948).
' Christoffel v. U. S., 171 F. 2d 1004 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
'Christoffel v. U.S., 336 U.S. 934 (1949).
'Christoffel v. U.S., 338 U.S. 84 (1949). Justices Black, Frankfurter, Doug-
las and Rutledge joined with Justice Murphy in the majority opinion.
'D. C. CODE, Title 22, Sec. 2501 (1940).
'In the years from 1797 to 1801 Thomas Jefferson who was then Vice-Presi-
deni of the U.S. and President of the Senate, prepared the notable work which is
now known as JEFRmsoN's MANuAL. This work has contributed much to the
procedure of the House, and in 1837 the House passed a rule, which still exists,
permitting the provisions of the Manual "to govern the House in all cases to
which they are applicable, and . . . not inconsistent" with the House rules.
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL. §938. The Manual along with other House rules is now
published as a public document, the current issue being H. R. Doc. No. 766, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1949).
'JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §§621-958.
'These rulings are to the rules of the House what the decisions of the courts
are to the statutes. All of the decisions (more than 11,000 in number) have been
embodied in HINDS' PRECEDENTS and CANNON'S PRECEDENTS.
I U.S. CoNsT., Art. 1, §5, cl. 1. Some text writers have expressed the view
that the power of a legislative body to make its own rules is an inherent power
and no constitutional mandate is necessary. 1 SOUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
srRucrioN, §602.
o U. S. CoNsT. Art. 1, §§5, 7.
"U.S. CoNsT. Art. 1, §5, cl. 2. After organization of the House the quorum
consists of a majority of those members chosen, sworn and living, whose member-
ship has not been terminated by resignation or by action of the House. IV HxNDs'
PRECEDENTS §§2889, 2890; VI CANNON'S PREcEDENTS 638. Under Speaker Reed's
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Accordingly it has been frequently ruled, that upon failure of a quorum,
no business, however highly privileged, is in order, and the only mo-
tions entertainable are those for a call of the House or to adjourn.12
Yet, it seems to be the accepted practice of the House that a quorum
is presumed to be present until otherwise determined,' 3 and no affirma-
tive duty seems to be placed upon the Chair to ascertain the presence
of a quorum unless the point is raised or disclosed. 14 Once absence
of a quorum is disclosed on a point of order,15 or a division,' 6 by
tellers,' 7 or on a yea or nay vote,' 5 business is automatically sus-
pended,' 9 and no business may be transacted, even by unanimous con-
sent, 20 and there must be a quorum of record before the House may
proceed ;21 nevertheless once a proceeding is completed it is then too late
to make the point that a quorum was not present when action was
taken.,22
The rules of the House are expressly made the rules of the standing
committees in so far as they are applicable.23 A majority of a commit-
tee constitutes a quorum for business, 24 and no measure or recommenda-
tion may be reported from a committee unless a majority of the com-
mittee is actually present.2 5 Contrary to the House practice, there must
be a quorum of record before the committee may proceed with busi-
ness.26
In applying these rules the Court seemed to narrow the issue to the
question-Once a quorum is ascertained on the record of the com-
mittee, does the presumption prevail that a quoroum continues until
the point of no quorum is made?
In a vigorous dissent,2 7 the minority insisted that the quorum
famous "count," the principle of a present rather than voting quorum was ac-
cepted, when Reed counted members present for purposes of a quorum, even
though they refused to vote. The constitutionality of this rule was questioned
and upheld in U.S. v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892), the Court ruling therein that the
Constitution prescribed no method of determining the presence of a majority.
" JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §768, IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §2950; VI CANNON'S
PRECEDENTS §680.
'- VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §624.
,VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §565. Even upon convening the House each day
it is not incumbent on the Speaker to raise the quorum question. IV HINDS'
PRECEDENTS §2733; VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §624.
" VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §662. " IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §2933.
"VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §707; VIII CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §3097.
"' IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §2953; VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §624.
"IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §§2933, 2934; VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §662.
"IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §2951; VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §§660, 686, 689.
21 IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §§2952, 2953.
"VI CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §655. " JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §738.
" JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §409; IV HINDS' PRECEDENTS §§4540, 4552.
"JEFFERSON'S MANUAL §943. 2"VIII CANNON'S PRECEDENTS §2222.
"'Justice Jackson writing for the minority was joined by Chief Justice Vinson
and Justices Reed and Burton. The dissent was based in part on the fact that
the identical issue had been raised in a previous perjury case and the Court denied
certiorari. Meyer v. U.S., 171 F. 2d 800 (D. C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
912 (1949).
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established at the convening of the committee session was presumed
to continue in absence of a challenge to the contrary, and contended
that the Court in holding otherwise was denying to the records and
rules of the Congress the respect and reliance to which they are entitled.
The "presumption" rule unquestionably is the "law" of the House,
but a search reveals no incident where the specific point has been dealt
with in committee. In the principal case there was a recorded quorum
when the committee convened, and the point of no quorum was neither
raised by petitioner nor a committee member. 28 The Court places much
reliance on the rule that no bill may be reported from a committee
unless a majority of the committee was actually present. 20 The rule
seems inappropriate for the purposes of this case. Indeed, the very
fact that the rule applies on its face only to the reporting of a bill,
suggests that a "physically present" quorum is not necessary to the
competency of the committee for some lesser purpose such as receiving
testimony. Besides, the argument might well be made that since the
committee rules are the same as the House rules where applicable, the
"presumption" rule prevails in the committee subject to the one condi-
tion that a quorum must be on record before the proceeding start. The
Court while apparently applying one of these rules, seemingly is unwill-
ing to apply the other. Therefore, the result reached seems to be
justified only by a strict, literal interpretation of the committee rule
requiring a quorum to do business, and upon the consideration that the
Court was satisfying a requirement of a criminal statute. From a prac-
tical viewpoint, considering the possible delays and inconveniences to
the orderly facilitation of committee business, the requisite of a "physi-
cally present" quorum seems extremely harsh if it is to apply to all
testimony as distinguished from testimony taken under oath as in the
principal case. There is ample evidence of Congressional disapproval
with the result reached. 30 In fact a bill has been introduced which
would expressly make the "presumption" rule applicable to com-
mittees.3 1
Assuming that the lecision rendered in the principal case would
indicate that an actual quorum must be present in order that a Con-
gressional committee may transact any business, does it follow that the
" Can a witness raise a point of no quorum? The Court did not rule on this,
but indicated that the privilege is limited to members of the committee. The dis-
sent suggested that a witness might well raise the point, and if the objection be
overruled, he would be at liberty to leave the hearing. H. R. 6166, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949), introduced shortly after this decision recognizes the right of a
witness to make the point of no quorum.
2' Sed note 25 supra.
50 95 CONG. Rac. A4366 (June 29, 1949) ; 95 CoNG. Rzc. 9845, 9858, 9859, 9884(July 18, 1949) ; 95 CONG. Rae. A4902 (July 21, 1949).
" H. R. 6166, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). No action was taken during the
1st Session on this measure.
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same rule would be made applicable in the House? The possibility that
legislation passed without a record vote might be "invalidated" was
suggested by the dissent.3 2
If the Court continues to follow the policy of several of its previous
decisions,33 to the effect that the enrolled bill 34 is conclusive evidence
of enactment, and that no other evidence is admissable to establish that
the bill was not lawfully enacted, such a proposition as is envisioned by
the dissent would seem to be without foundation.
LINDSAY C. WARPEN, JR.
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Conflict with Power of
State to Control Breaches of the Peace
There are inherent inconsistencies between the power of the state
to punish breaches of the peace and the constitutional protections of
the First Amendment. The case of Terminiello v. Chicago' exemplifies
the problem of weighing the sometimes conflicting social interests in
the maintenance of public order and in the free expression of ideas.
The case arose out of an address by Terminiello before an audience
of over eight hundred. About one thousand persons, opposed to his
espoused doctrine of racial and religious supremacy, had gathered about
the auditorium in protest. A police detail, assigned to the meeting,
was unable to prevent several disturbances and minor acts of violence.
The speech itself viciously attacked various political and racial groups.
The general setting, then, was an address, pseudopolitical in nature, but
scurrilous and opprobrious in content, delivered in an auditorium sur-
rounded by an angry and turbulent crowd.
Terminiello, after jury trial, was convicted of violating an ordinance 2 -
of the City of Chicago by making an improper noise or diversion tend-
ing to a breach of the peace.
The trial court charged that "misbehavior may constitute a breach
" Christoffel v. U.S., 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
"Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1891) ; Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649 (1894);
Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547 (1896); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167
U.S. 196 (1897); Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); see Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457 (1939) (concurring opinion) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy,
220 U.S. 107, 143 (1910); cf. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); U.S. v.
Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
" An enrolled bill generally refers to a bill which purports to have passed both
houses of the legislature, and which has been signed by the presiding officers of the
two houses. The Supreme Court of the U.S. includes not only process of enact-
ment within the legislature itself, but also signature by the President and filing
with the Secretary of State.
169 Sup. Ct. 894 (1949).
'"All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any im-
proper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a
breach of the peace . . . shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct . . 2, , City
of Chicago, REV. CODE 1939, c. 193, §1(1).
